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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3102(3)(a).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
ISSUE NO. 1:

Whether the Court of appeals erred in concluding any

modification of the lease agreement only extended the time for making payments.
Standard of Review: On a writ of Certiorari, this Court reviews the decision
of the Court of Appeals for correctness. Richards v. Brown, 274 P.3d 911.
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding an extension
of time to make payment did not constitute a material modification of the lease that
relieved the Petitioner of any obligation as guarantor.
Standard of Review: On a writ of Certiorari, this Court reviews the decision
of the Court of Appeals for correctness. Richards v. Brown, 274 P.3d 911.
ISSUE NO. 3: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in declining to address
Petitioner's arguments for an alternate ground for affirmance and in remanding with
a directive to enter judgment in favor of Respondent.
Standard of Review: On a writ of Certiorari, this Court reviews the decision
of the Court of Appeals for correctness. Richards v. Brown, 274 P.3d 911.
DETERMINATIVE LAW

1

The Respondent believes the following authorities are determinative of this
appeal or are of central importance to the appeal:
Central Florida Invs. V. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, 40 P.3d 599.
Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty, §50, (1996).
38 Am. Jur. 2d Guaranty §53, (2016).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the case, course of proceedings and disposition below.
PC Riverview, LLC (Riverview) acquired the subject property in June 2006.

The property is a shopping mall located at approximately 625-700 West 5300
South, Murray, Utah, consisting of approximately 18 business rental units.

The

property purchased included an Assignment and Assumption of Leases, transferring
to Riverview the landlord’s interest in each of the leases of the tenants occupying
rental units on the property, including the lease of Hong G. Lin and Xiao-Yan Cao
(Cao). Mr. Lin acquired his interest in the subject lease from the previous tenant, L
and C Unlimited in March 2006, prior to Riverview’s purchase of the property. Ms.
Cao was the president of L and C Unlimited, the assignor, and she personally
guaranteed full performance of all of the tenant’s obligations under the lease,
including the payment of rent. By May 1, 2010, Mr. Lin, the owner of Golden Isle
Restaurant, was delinquent in rent owed under the lease and Riverview filed an
action against Mr. Lin and Ms. Cao for the amount past due. While the action was
pending, Mr. Lin cured the delinquency pursuant to a written agreement between
2

Riverview and Mr. Lin and Riverview attempted to voluntarily dismiss the 2010
lawsuit. After the lawsuit was filed, Ms. Cao moved the court to require Riverview
to evict Mr. Lin from the property and objected to the voluntary dismissal. Because
of the agreement allowing Mr. Lin time to cure the delinquency, Riverview refused
to evict Mr. Lin. Mr. Lin paid the delinquency in full pursuant to the agreement.
Subsequently, the court dismissed the action for lack of prosecution.
When the lease terminated at the end of September 2013, Mr. Lin vacated
the property but he did not pay the last months’ rent owed under the lease.
Riverview filed the current action, seeking to recover the rent owed.
Riverview was successful in obtaining summary judgment against Mr Lin
and the action proceeded to a bench trial against Ms. Cao on April 29, 2015. The
trial court entered judgment against Riverview, in favor of Ms. Cao, ruling that the
agreement between Mr. Lin and Riverview that allowed Mr. Lin time to cure the
rent delinquency materially modified the terms of the subject lease and
consequently voided Ms. Cao’s personal liability and made her guaranty
unenforceable. The Order and Judgment was entered on May 26, 2015. Riverview
timely filed its Notice of Appeal on June 11, 2015. The Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court and ordered that the trial court enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff.
B. Statement of Facts.
1. In June 1993, Riverview’s predecessor in interest, Riverview
Properties, a general partnership, owned the property at issue in this case and
3

entered into the written lease agreement as landlord, with Cheuk Yue, Guo
Q. Peng and Sam Yue, doing business as Royal China Restaurant, as tenants.
(Plaintiff’s Trial Ex. 2).
2. In July 1996, Cheuk Yue, Guo Q. Peng and Sam Yue assigned their
interests in the lease to Li Ling Huang. (Plaintiff’s Trial Ex. 3).
3. In January 1997, Li Ling Huang assigned his interest in the lease to
Chia Teng Tsao and Hong Min Zhang, doing business as Golden Isle
Restaurant. (Plaintiff’s Trial Ex. 4).
4. In October 2003, Chia Teng Tsao and Hong Min Zhang assigned their
interest in the lease to L and C Unlimited Corp.

Xiao Yao Cao, the

defendant and appellant in this action, signed the Assignment as president of
L and C Unlimited Corp. and she also signed as personal guarantor of the
lease, guaranteeing “performance of all covenants, conditions and
obligations and duties required of Tenant under said Lease from and after
October 1, 2003”. (Plaintiff’s Trial Ex. 6).
5. In March 2006, L and C Unlimited Corp. assigned its interest in the
lease to Hong G. Lin, the co-defendant in this action. Ms. Cao executed the
Assignment on behalf of L and C Unlimited Corp. and she also signed as
Guarantor, individually agreeing to “remain obligated to Landlord for the
full performance of all covenants, conditions and obligations and duties
required of Tenant under the Lease. . .” The Assignment signed by Ms. Cao
4

and Mr. Lin also extended the lease term to September 30, 2013. (Plaintiff’s
Trial Ex. 7).
6. On June 19, 2006, Riverview acquired the property and received an
Assignment and Assumption of Leases, including the lease of Mr. Lin, doing
business as Golden Isle Restaurant. (Plaintiff’s Trial Ex. 1).
7. By May 2010, Mr. Lin was delinquent in rent owed under the lease in
an amount exceeding $22,000.00 due and Riverview filed suit against Mr.
Lin and Ms. Cao to recover the delinquent rent. (R. 242, p. 18, lines 14-19).
While the suit was pending, Riverview agreed to allow Mr. Lin time to pay
the delinquent rent. (Defendant’s Trial Ex. 2).
8. Mr. Lin paid the delinquent rent required by the agreement and
Riverview requested that the parties stipulate to a dismissal of the action.
Ms. Cao, through her attorney, had filed a motion to require Riverview to
terminate Mr. Lin’s tenancy and refused to stipulate to a dismissal. As the
delinquent rent was paid in full, Riverview declined to further prosecute the
action and it was ultimately dismissed without prejudice by the court for lack
of prosecution. (R. 242, pp 18, 19, Defendant’s Ex. 3; PC Riverview v. Lin,
Salt Lake District Court, Civil No. 100908746).
9. Mr. Lin vacated the premises at the end of the lease term (September
30, 2013), but he did not pay the last month’s rent plus a small balance owed
for the previous month. (R. 242, p.17; R. 3, 4).
5

10. Riverview commenced this present action against Mr. Lin and Ms.
Cao to recover the balance owed under the lease. . (R. 3,4).
11. Riverview obtained summary judgment against Defendant Lin on
Dec. 9, 2014. (CR 200-201).
12. The case against Defendant Cao proceeded to trial on April 29, 2015.
(See trial transcript).
13. The trial court ruled that the agreement between Riverview and
Defendant Lin was a material modification of the lease agreement, thus
relieving Defendant Cao of her guaranty. (TT 51).
14. Riverview filed it Notice of Appeal on June 11, 2015.
15. The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court and ordered
that the trial court enter judgment in favor of Riverview, against Defendant
Cao. (Court of Appeals decision).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Riverview is the landlord and Mr. Lin, doing business as Golden Isle
Restaurant, was the tenant of the premises located at 671 West 5300 South, Murray,
Utah. Mr. Lin became the tenant through an Assignment and Extension of Lease
Agreement, signed by Ms. Cao, in which she not only signed as Guarantor, but she
also agreed to “remain obligated to Landlord for the full performance of all
covenants, conditions and obligations and duties required of Tenant under the
Lease. . .” Mr. Lin vacated the premises at the end of the lease term, but failed to
6

pay the charges that accrued during the last month of his tenancy. Although the
trial court earlier had granted summary judgment in favor of Riverview against Mr.
Lin in the amount of $10,148.43, the court erroneously ruled after a bench trial that
since Riverview allowed Mr. Lin time in 2010 to pay rent that was delinquent, Ms.
Cao’s personal liability, including her guarantee which was absolute and
unconditional, was void and unenforceable.
The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court, declaring that the
agreement allowing the Defendants time to pay the delinquent rent was not a
material modification of the lease agreement. The Court of Appeals ruled that
Defendant Cao's personal guaranty was enforceable and ordered the trial court to
enter judgment in favor of Riverview and against Cao.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE
MODIFIED

LEASE

AGREEMENT

WAS

NOT

MATERIALLY

Ms. Cao argues that the Court of Appeals' ruling that the agreement
extending time to pay the past due rent was not a material modification of the lease,
"was incorrect on two levels." She argues that before the agreement was signed,
"Plaintiff and Defendant Lin engaged in a series of actions that ran contrary to their
obligations under the lease agreement." Other than arguing that Lin fell behind in
his rent and continued to incur past due rent and late fees, Cao identifies no other
actions that run contrary to the lease obligations. Obviously, an extension to pay
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need only be granted if the obligor does fall behind in payments. If there were not
a default in payment, there would be no need for an extension. The late fees that
Cao argues modified the agreement, most of which Riverview waived, were
consistent with the lease agreement, not a modification of its terms.
Ms. Cao also argues that "the Workout Agreement modified more than the
timing of the Tenant's rent payments." Cao argues that "Plaintiff and Lin agreed that
Defendant Lin should make partial rent payments over several month[s]." That is
not true. Riverview never "agreed" that Lin should make partial rent payments.
The record, specifically the previous lawsuit and the

"Workout Agreement",

evidences just the opposite. Although Riverview did in fact agree to extend the
time to pay the past due rent, Riverview insisted that Defendant Lin make the
payments required by the lease agreement. Ms. Cao characterizes the makeup
payments as "balloon payments", arguing that as such, that is further modification
of the lease agreement. However, those payments were not tacked on to the end of
the lease as balloon payments. Whether the payments are called balloon payments
or something else, they were simply payments made that Riverview required Lin to
make to catch up on the past due rent.

Again, it seems obvious that any time an

extension of time to make payments is given, it will require payments to be made in
addition to the regular payments called for in the lease. That does not make them
balloon payments. If the payments were all made on time, there would be no need
for an extension. If not made on time, additional payments will be required.
8

As the Court of Appeals correctly ruled, "[T]he Workout was the sole
modification of the original lease, and the Workout only modified the timing of the
Tenant's payments by extending the time in which past due rent could be paid."
Court of Appeals Decision page 4.
II. AN EXTENSION OF TIME DOES NOT MATERIALLY MODIFY
A LEASE
Although counsel for Riverview found no decision of this Court where the
precise issue of whether an extension of time for payment constitutes a material
modification of a contract such that a guarantor would be released from his
guaranty, the Court of Appeals correctly followed precedent and ruled that it does
not. This Court in First SEC. Bank of Utah v. Creech, 858 P.2d 958 (Utah 1993),
avoided the specific issue1, but did rule that the guarantors were not relived from
their guaranty, even though the principle obligors entered into a stipulation
extending the time for payments. In Creech, the elder Creeches obtained a loan,
which was guaranteed by the younger Creeches. The elder Creeches filed for
bankruptcy protection, but after several months, the bankruptcy petition was
dismissed. While the bankruptcy petition was pending, no payments were made on
the loan, although the bank and the elder Creeches did enter into a stipulation which
provided among other things, for reduced payments on the loan. After the elder
1

"The younger Creeches also argue that the stipulation between their parents and the
bank materially modified the terms of the commercial debts they had accepted as
guarantors and that this modification constitutes a discharge of their obligation to
perform. [citation omitted] We decline to address this contention." (Creech, p. 967).
9

Creeches defaulted on the terms of the stipulation, the bank sued the elder Creeches
and the younger Creeches. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants, based
upon the trial court’s interpretation of bankruptcy law. On appeal, this Court
affirmed the ruling in favor of the elder Creeches, but reversed as to the younger
Creeches on their guaranty, rejecting the argument of the younger Creeches that the
bank should be estopped from claiming a default because the bank agreed to accept
reduced payments and entered into a stipulation with the older Creeches to extend
the time for payment.
Our Court of Appeals has followed the majority of jurisdictions in adopting
the Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty (1996) as controlling law on
this issue. In reversing the trial court in this case, the Court of Appeals cited its
own earlier decision of Dimeo v. Nupetco Associates, LLC, 2013 UT App 188, f.n.
2 (“While DiMeo argues that the time extension for repayment granted to Michael
Strand, as well as his interest-only payments, were material modifications of the
original contract, such minor alterations are not of the nature or degree that would
trigger a discharge of their pledge of security under suretyship law. See Restatement
(Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty §41 (1996)”)

This reasoning is particularly

true in our case, where the very lease agreement that Ms. Cao was contractually
bound to uphold, provided in Section 27.01, that
One or more waivers of any covenant or condition by Landlord shall
not be construed as a waiver of a subsequent breach of the same
covenant or condition and the consent or approval to or of any
10

subsequent or similar act by Tenant. (Plaintiff’s Ex. 2, ¶ 27.01at
p.18).
The lease provided that the landlord could waive a default in the timely
payment of rent. In this case, none of the terms of the lease was changed. The
leased space remained the same. The lease term remained the same. The monthly
rent due under the lease was not changed.

None of the other conditions or

obligations was changed. The letter allowing Lin time to pay the delinquent rent
made it clear that the underlying terms of the lease remained the same, by stating,
“These payments will be in addition to the monthly charges as per your lease
agreement.” (Defendant’s Ex 2).
As stated in Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty, (1996),
§50. Effect on Secondary Obligation of Obligee’s Lack of Action to
Enforce Underlying Obligation
(1) Delay by the obligee [Riverview] in taking action against the
principal obligor [Lin] with respect to the underlying obligation, or
failure of the obligee to take such action, does not discharge the
secondary obligor [Cao] with respect to the secondary obligation
except as provided:
(a) by applicable statute;
(b) by agreement of the parties;
(c) in §43 of this Restatement2; or
(d) in subsection (2) of this section.
(2) If the failure of efforts by the obligee to obtain satisfaction of
the underlying obligation is a condition of the secondary obligor’s duty
pursuant to the secondary obligation, the secondary obligor is
discharged to the extent that the obligee’s failure to act with
reasonable promptness against the principal obligor is the cause of the
obligee's inability to collect from the principal obligor.
2

§43 provides that if the obligee delays to the extent that the statute of limitations
bars action on the obligation, the secondary obligor may be discharged.
11

None of the exceptions listed applies.

There is no applicable statute or any

agreement that would discharge Ms. Cao. There is no statute of limitations issue,
because all of the delinquent rent was paid. Ms. Cao’s obligation and guaranty was
not conditioned on Riverview’s efforts to obtain satisfaction from Mr. Lin.
Accordingly, Ms. Cao is still obligated under her guaranty, even if the court were to
find that she was only a guarantor of Lin’s performance and not primarily liable for
the rent payments. The following illustrations are given on page 50 of the above
referenced Restatement and fit squarely within the facts of this case, if the court
were to determine that Ms. Cao is only secondarily liable:
1. P owes C $1,000.00 with S as secondary obligor. P defaults and S
requests C to sue P. C refuses. Thereafter C sues S. C’s refusal to
sue will not prevent C from obtaining and enforcing judgment
against S.
2. P owes C $1,000.00 with S as secondary obligor. P defaults and C
conducts a series of negotiations with P in respect of payment
without modifying the contract between C and P. The negotiations
are fruitless. Although P was solvent at the time of default, P
becomes wholly insolvent during the period of the delay. S is not
discharged from its secondary obligation by reason of the delay.
Court’s from other jurisdictions have also cited Restatement (Third) of
Suretyship and Guaranty, supra, as controlling. See John T. Callahan & Sons v.
Dykeman Elec. Co., Inc. 266 F. Supp. 2d 208, 238 (D. Mass 2003) (“Accordingly,
Callahan’s delay in declaring a default, even if it prejudiced Wassau’s ability to
obtain reimbursement from the principal obligors under the general indemnity
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agreement, does not discharge Wassau from its obligations under the performance
bond.”)
Court’s from other jurisdictions have also ruled that an extension of time to
pay an obligation, is not normally considered to be a material modification of the
underlying obligation and will not affect the guarantor’s obligation to pay, unless
the extension materially adversely impacts the guarantor, such as increasing his
risk, or materially changing his obligation. See Modern Photo Offset Supply v.
Woodfield Group, 663 N.E.2d 547, 551 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), citing Cunningham v.
Mid State Bank 544 N.E.2D 530,534 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). (“[A] material alteration
which will effect the discharge of a guarantor must be a change which alters the
legal identity of the principal’s contract, substantially increases the risk of loss to
the guarantor, or places the guarantor in a different position.”) In our case, this did
not happen. Allowing Lin time to pay the delinquent rent worked to Ms. Cao’s
benefit rather than detriment, by reducing the delinquency owed by Mr. Lin and
ultimately, by Ms. Cao. Had Riverview evicted Lin in 2010, as requested by Ms.
Cao, Ms. Cao would have owed over $20,000.00, plus the court costs and attorney’s
fees of the action, plus such additional rent as it came due until another suitable
tenant could be found for the leased space. This is particularly true, where Utah's
unlawful detainer statute is clear, that if a tenant under a lease is evicted for nonpayment of rent, that does not release the tenant, and in this case Cao as guarantor,

13

from the payment of rent for the remainder of the lease term. §78B-6-811(1)(d)(i)
provides:
A forfeiture under (1)(c) ["If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after
. . . a default in the payment of rent"] does not release a defendant from
any obligation for payments on a lease for the remainder of the lease's
term.
As Ms. Mitchell testified at trial, in 2010, the commercial lease market was
distressed and Riverview had other vacancies in the shopping center at the time that
could not be filled. Because of those conditions, she thought it best to work with
Mr. Lin by allowing him time to make up the delinquent rent, keeping him as a rent
paying tenant, rather than have another vacancy in the shopping mall with no
income from that unit for the foreseeable future. (R. 242, p18). Ms. Mitchell was
correct in her analysis. All of the delinquency was paid, relieving Ms. Cao of that
liability under her agreement and guaranty.
This case is strikingly similar to the case of WXI/Z Southwest Malls v.
Mueller, 137 N.M. 343, 110 P.3d 1080 (2005). In Mueller, Mr. and Ms. Ritter
entered into a ten year lease with the landlord. Eight years into the lease, the Ritters
sought to assign the lease to the Muellers, who would continue to operate the
business. The landlord consented to the assignment on the condition that the Ritters
would continue to be liable for rent and would guaranty the lease. The assignment
signed by the Ritters, contained the requested

provisions.

The lease was

subsequently assigned to an entity in which the Muellers had some interest, and
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again the landlord consented to the assignment on the condition that the Ritters and
the Muellers would continue to be liable for the rent and would be guarantors of the
lease.

These terms were included in the new assignment. The new tenant failed to

pay the monthly rent and the landlord failed to evict the tenant or take action to
terminate the lease. The new tenant did not surrender possession of the premises
and two years after the tenant stopped paying rent, the landlord brought suit against
the Ritters, the Muellers and the new tenant. The Muellers and the new tenant filed
for bankruptcy and were discharged. The Ritters defended the action, claiming that
they were discharged from the obligation because the landlord failed to notify them
of the delinquency and failed to take any action to evict the tenant or terminate the
lease. The trial court denied the landlord’s motion for summary judgment. The
appellate court reversed, holding that the tenants’ guaranty was absolute, that the
landlord was not required to give any notice of the latest assignee tenant’s default in
the payment of rent and that the contract signed by the Ritters, being clear and
unambiguous, would be enforced according to its terms.
In our case, Ms. Cao and her company, L and C Unlimited Corp. were the
prior tenants of the subject property. She had personally assumed and guaranteed
all of L & C’s obligations under the lease. She requested that she be allowed to
assign the lease to Lin. The landlord would not allow the assignment to a new
lessee, unless she agreed to remain personally obligated on the lease, which she did.
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Her guarantee is absolute and unconditional, clear and unambiguous. It should be
enforced according to its terms.
III. THE ISSUES RAISED BY CAO DID NOT REQUIRE A REMAND
TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR DETERMINATION
Cao argues that she only guaranteed performance of the original lease, through
April 30, 2008. She argues that under the Assignment and Guaranty dated March 9,
2006 (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7), L and C Unlimited Corp. signed the document as
assignor and Cao only signed as guarantor of the remaining term of the prior lease.
Cao is mistaken. If the intent of having Cao sign the document as guarantor was truly
nothing more than that, having her sign Exhibit 7 was superfluous. She was already
obligated as guarantor under the previous lease. Plaintiff’s Exhibit 6 provided:
Xiao Yan Cao, an individual, shall be the guarantor and hereby
guarantees performance of all covenants, conditions and obligations
and duties required of tenant under said lease from and after October
1, 2003.
The fact that Ms. Cao never raised this particular issue, either in the earlier
case involving these same parties and the same lease (Civil #10090874, Petitioner’s
Statement of Facts #4, at page 5 of Petitioner’s brief), or at the trial of this case,
evidences her acknowledgment that her guaranty continued through the extended
period of the lease, through September 30, 2013. The intent of the parties in
assigning and extending the lease beyond 2008, is clear. Cao Was a guarantor of
the previous lease and the landlord required her to continue her guaranty through
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the extended period, particularly where the lease was being assigned to a new
tenant. Paragraph 3 of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7, which Ms. Cao signed, provides:
Assignor and Guarantor [Ms. Cao] agree to and shall remain
obligated to Landlord for the full performance of all covenants,
conditions and duties required of Tenant under the Lease and shall not
be relieved of any performance of obligations thereunder as the result
of this assignment. (Emphasis added).
Paragraph 11 of Exhibit 7 defined the term of “the lease” she guaranteed:
The lease term shall be extended for an additional five (5) year period
commencing October 1, 2008 and ending September 30, 2013 (hereinafter
“Extension Term”)
Ms Cao recognized and understood that she was guaranteeing the tenant’s
obligations beyond the initial term of the lease and through the extended term.
When she learned in 2010, two years after she now claims that her guaranty ended,
that Mr. Lin was delinquent in paying rent she requested that PC Riverview evict
Lin from the premises. Her reasons for doing so, as she first argued in her Apellee's
brief filed in the Utah Court of Appeals:
By evicting Defendant Lin, Defendant Cao sought to protect her own
position. After an eviction, Defendant Cao could have either
reestablished herself in the business or she could have sold the
business to a more stable business owner. (Pages 20-21 of Brief of
Appellee Xiao Yan Cao in the Utah Court of Appeals).
If Ms. Cao’s guaranty had ended in 2008, as she now argues, she could not have
either reestablished herself in the business, or sold the business in 2010.
Even in her brief before this Court, she argues at page 23,
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Defendant Cao's refusal to consent to the Workout [in 2010] was not
without reason. Plaintiff allowed Defendant Lin to make partial rent
payments for several months without notifying Defendant Cao.
During this time, Defendant Cao's financial burden increased without
any notice from either party.
Had her guaranty expired in 2008, her financial burden would not have
increased in 2010.
It is a basic maxim of contract interpretation, that contracts are interpreted in
accordance with the plain meaning of their terms, absent some ambiguity. Central
Florida Invs. V. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, ¶12, 40 P.3d 599. (“If the language
within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties, intentions are
determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language and the contract
may be interpreted as a matter of law.”) See also Merrick Young Inc. v. Wal Mart
Real Estate Bus. Trust, 2011 UT App 164, ¶17, 257 P.3d 1031. (“The goal of
contract interpretation is to give effect to the contracting parties’ intentions at the
time the contract was made.”).
In order for the landlord to allow the assignment of the lease to Lin, the
landlord required Ms. Cao, who was obligated before the assignment to perform all
of the covenants, conditions, etc. of the tenant, to continue to be primarily liable
when the new tenant (Lin) became the lessee. The contract term is clear and
unambiguous. Ms. Cao is jointly and severally liable, along with Mr. Lin, for the
payment of the rent.
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Ms. Cao also argues that there was no appropriate assignment of the Lease to
Riverview. She makes this argument, even though she states as a Fact in her
opening Brief, "3. On or about June 19, 2006, PC Riverview acquired the leased
property from Riverview Properties." Brief of Petitioner, page 5.
Plaintiff’s Ex. 1, the Assignment of the property and leases to Riverview,
was offered in this case and was received as evidence by the trial Court. Rule 78B5-608, U.C.A., states "A writing may be proved either (1) by anyone who saw the
writing executed."

Rule 901, Utah Rules of Evidence, states that an item of

evidence may be authenticated by "b(1) Testimony of a witness with knowledge.
Testimony that an item is what it is claimed to be." The document was properly
authenticated by Grace Mitchell, president of PC Riverview, who testified that it
was what it was, that she signed the document and witnessed the signatures of the
other parties to the Assignment. (R. 242, p.9).

Cao offered no evidence to the

contrary. There really is no dispute that Plaintiff acquired the subject property,
including the lease at issue here. All of the parties were aware that PC Riverview
was the owner and landlord of the property.

Ms. Mitchell testified that PC

Riverview owns the property (R. 242, p.8) and that Lin had been paying rent to PC
Riverview under the terms of the lease at issue (R. 242, p. 19).
Cao seems to argue that since she was not aware of the sale to PC Riverview,
that somehow voids her guaranty. She cites no authority for the proposition that the
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owner of real property must notify the guarantor of a lease on the property, that the
property will be sold. In this case, the lease itself provided that the landlord could
sell the property, and if it did, the lessee had to accept the purchaser as the new
landlord. Section 13.2 of the Lease (Plaintiff’s Tr. Ex. 2) provides:
ATTORNMENT. In the event any proceeding is brought for the
foreclosure of, or in the event of exercise of the power of sale under
any mortgage or deed of trust made by Landlord covering the Leased
Premises, or in the event Landlord conveys in a sale all of its rights
and duties in and to the Lease and Leased Premises, Tenant shall
attorn to the Purchaser upon any such foreclosure or sale and shall
recognize such purchaser as the Landlord under this Lease.
(Emphasis added).
The facts of this case dictate that Ms. Cao is obligated to pay Riverview for
the rent owed under the lease. The Assignment and Extension Agreement signed by
Ms. Cao in 2006, extended the term of the Lease to September 30, 2013. By the
terms of the Agreement, Ms. Cao agreed to be personally responsible for and
guaranteed the full performance of all covenants, conditions and obligations and
duties required of Tenant under the Lease, including the payment of rent through
September 30, 2013. By August 2010, Lin was delinquent in rent payments a total
of $23,951.28. (Defendant’s Ex. 2). By written agreement, Riverview agreed to
allow Lin approximately five months to catch up the delinquent rent, while
continuing to pay the ongoing, current rent. (Defendant’s Ex. 2). The agreement
extending time to pay the delinquency made no changes in the underlying lease.
The leased premises remained the same, the term of the lease did not change, the
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monthly rent stayed the same. Mr. Lin did make up the payments required by the
agreement after the Complaint was filed and he stayed current for the next three
years. (R. 242, pp.28, 29). When Mr. Lin vacated the leased premises at the end of
the lease term, he owed only $5,003.50 (R. 4), much less than what was owed when
the agreement allowing him time to make up the delinquency was signed. This
amounted to slightly less than one month’s rent due under the subject lease, which
was $5,004.00 per month. (Plaintiff’s Ex. 2, para. 12).
IV. CAO WAS NOT JUST A SURETY. SHE WAS PERSONALLY
OBLIGATED TO PAY THE LEASE PAYMENTS
Ms. Cao argues that she should be released from her guaranty because she
was not informed of Lin's delinquency and was not consulted when Riverview and
Lin agreed to the extension of payments. As the Court of Appeals noted, the
guaranty agreement signed by Ms. Cao "contained no provisions spelling out
particular rights in favor of Cao, such as a right to notice or a bar on extensions or
modifications absent her consent." Court of Appeals Decision page 3.
Cao guaranteed full performance of all obligations of Lin.

Under the

guaranty, she was primarily liable for the rent, not just a surety, as she argues.
Being primarily liable, it was her obligation, not that of Riverview, to stay in touch
with her co-obligor regarding the lease payments.
A contract of guaranty may be absolute, or it may be conditional.

An

absolute guaranty is one where the guarantor has promised that if the debtor does
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not pay the obligation when it is due, the guarantor will do so. The liability of the
guarantor becomes fixed on default of the debtor. “A guaranty of the payment of an
obligation, without words of limitation or condition, is construed as an absolute or
unconditional guaranty.” 38 Am Jur2d Guaranty §21. Ms. Cao’s guaranty was
absolute and unconditional. She agreed to remain obligated to pay all of the rent
and other charges that accrued under the lease for the full term of the lease, which
did not terminate until September 30, 2013. The language of the guaranty cited
above, has no words of limitation or condition.

Ms. Cao absolutely and

unconditionally guaranteed the payment of rent, along with the performance of all
of the other terms of the lease through the end of the lease term, which was
September 30, 2013.

When Mr. Lin failed to pay the rent, Ms. Cao became

primarily and personally obligated to do so under her guaranty.
Personal guarantees are in common usage in today’s business world. Banks,
lenders, creditors, seller’s of merchandise and landlords all use them and rely on
their enforceability.

Riverview is a commercial property landlord and obtains

personal guarantees on most of its leases. Banks and other creditors probably do
substantially the same, when dealing with a corporate entity or an individual with
limited financial resources. If personal, absolute, unconditional guarantees are not
enforceable if the creditor extends the time for payment of the debt, we must all
change the way we do business. If a creditor could not work with the debtor in an
attempt to allow time to catch up on past due amounts owed, there would certainly
22

be fewer loans made to corporate defendants and individuals with limited financial
resources, less credit would be extended, leasing property by a proposed tenant
would be more difficult and many more lawsuits would be filed,. That is not the
law, nor should it be. The case law, as well as the treatises, such as Am Jur 2nd
Guaranty and the Restatement 3rd Suretyship and Guaranty cited above, support
Riverview's position. Allowing a debtor additional time to pay an obligation does
not amount to a material modification of the debt and does not affect its
enforceability against the personal guarantor. This is particularly true, where the
guaranty is absolute and unconditional, as is Cao's.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Riverview submits that the Utah Court of Appeals
correctly reversed the Trial Court in ruling that the lease was not materially
modified, and that Ms. Cao’s guaranty were valid and enforceable. The facts are
sufficiently clear that no remand is necessary.
Riverview respectfully requests that the decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals be affirmed and that the Trial Court be directed to enter judgment in favor
of Riverview and against Ms. Cao, jointly and severally with Mr. Lin. Riverview
requests that it also be awarded its Court costs and attorney’s fees, including its
costs and attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.
Dated this

17th

day of February, 2017.
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